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Abstract. Shared water resources are strong sources of conflict in the Jordan River basin shared by
Israel, Jordan, Palestine, Syria and Lebanon. The control and allocation of water has been explicitly
made a part of the ongoing peace negotiations. This article calls for the application of international
water law in the resolution of water disputes in the negotiating process. The challenging task for
negotiators is to translate water law principles into operating rules and procedures for the equitable
apportionment of waters from shared water resources. The negotiators need a decision tool based
upon objective criteria or standards to reach equitable entitlements to shared water resources by all
parties. This paper introduces a multi-criteria decision tool as a possible approach to the problem
of allocating the waters of the Jordan River between all riparian parties. The prime principle of the
criteria is equitable allocation factors identified by water law. A general mathematical model was
derived in which the proportional entitlements of the Jordan River basin waters were determined to
the five riparians. It is hoped that, water negotiators review this approach.
Key words: conflict resolution, equitable allocation, International river basin management, Jordan
river basin, middle east, riparian water rights, transboundary waters
1. Introduction
Shared fresh water resources have been the source of international friction and
tension for many years, in many places. World wide, approximately fifty percent
of all land area is contained within international drainage basins, and more than
200 rivers are shared by two or more nations. These geographical facts have led
to the geopolitical reality of disputes over shared international rivers, including the
Nile, Jordan, and Euphrates. Shared water resources are especially strong sources
of conflict in the Middle East particularly in the Jordan River basin shared by Israel,
Jordan, Palestine (West Bank and Gaza), Syria and Lebanon. In this basin, water
has been the roots, means, and causes of war. The control and allocation of water
has evolved into an issue of ‘high politics’, and it has been explicitly made a part
of the ongoing peace negotiations (Gleick, 1994).
The present problems that are related to water in the Jordan River riparian
countries that are generally characterised by aridity and water scarcity are many
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and varied and the disparity between water supply and demand is growing with
time due to rapid population growth (Mimi and Smith, 2000). Unless all states
cooperate and jointly manage their shared water resources they all stand to lose in
terms of the long-term viability of their water systems. States can no longer fully
satisfy their needs from common resources without adversely affecting (whether
in terms of quantity or quality) the supply available to others. Both surface and
groundwater resources of the basin suffer from overuse. The Jordan River south
of the Lake Taberias becomes almost dry at summer times because of upstream
diversion works. Because of this decreased flow the level of the Dead Sea has fallen
from 392 to 407 m below sea level over the last years. As a result, groundwater
levels have dropped and signs of the salination of the Jordan Valley’ soils can be
seen (Salameh, 1992). In other words, the only real choice all sides face is between
a lose-lose situation if they do not cooperate, and a potential win-win situation if
they do.
Over the past 100 years, many management plans and attempts to reach agree-
ments over water resources in the Jordan River basin have been proposed. Al-Kloub
and Abu-Taleb (1998) discussed the major formal plans like the Main Plan/Unified
Plan (1953), Cotton Plan (1954), Arab Plan (1954), and Johnston Plan (1953).
Countries in the region have continued to develop their water resources, often at
the expense of other countries. Subsequent to the dissolution of the Johnston Plan,
both Israel and Jordan decided to proceed with their water projects situated entirely
within their own boundaries. As a result Israel constructed the National Water
Carrier, which brings water from Lake Taberias to the south and central regions
of Israel. Jordan further developed the East Ghor Canal off the Yarmouk River for
irrigation.
In the Jordan River basin, the international water laws that regulate riparian
rights are not well observed. No comprehensive agreements between all neigh-
bouring countries exist, except the bilateral Jordanian-Israeli agreement signed in
1994. The agreement guarantees to Jordan about 215 million cubic meters per
year (Mcm yr−1), and sets the rules for rehabilitating the Jordan River water and
for protecting the quality of shared water resources in both states (Al-Kloub and
Abu-Taleb, 1998).
Currently, Arabs and Israelis are trying to break the political cycle of conflict
within the framework of the Middle East peace process negotiations. Barring a col-
lapse of the process, they will at some point have to confront the complex problem
of water, including the definition of entitlements to shared fresh water resources.
The challenge, however, will be to negotiate a fair and reasonable assignment of
entitlements based on existing international water law. Therefore, the negotiators
need a decision tool based upon objective criteria or standards to reach accept-
able entitlements to shared water resources by all parties. This paper introduces
one such multi-criteria decision tool and provides one possible approach to the
problem of allocating the waters of the Jordan River between all riparian parties.
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The approach depends on the discussion of the principles of a comprehensive
water-sharing regime drawn from the international law of transboundary waters.
2. The Jordan River Basin System
The Jordan River originates in the southwestern Anti-Lebanon range, on Mount
Hermon (Jabel Esh-Sheikh), which is covered with permanent snow. The river
flows through Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Palestine and Israel. The discharge that feeds
the upper part of the Jordan River is derived principally from the group of karstic
springs located on the Western and southern slopes of Mount Hermon.
The river flows southwards for a distance of 228 km along the bottom of a
longitudinal graven known as the Rift Valley before emptying into the Dead Sea.
Its principal tributary, the Yarmouk, forms the boarder between Syria and Jordan
and divides Israel and Jordan in the Yarmouk triangle. Based on the nature of the
hydrology, hydrogeology, and water use, the Jordan river system may be classified
into three sections, namely: (1) Upper Jordan River that includes three major head-
water streams: (i) the Dan, (ii) the Hasbani and (iii) the Banias; and (iv) the Huleh
valley and (v) Lake Tiberias; (2) Yarmouk river which is the largest tributary of
the Jordan river system; (3) Lower Jordan river which flows through the deepest
portion of the Rift Valley to enter the Dead Sea at 401 m below sea level, the
lowest point of the earth. The natural flow of the river in the absence of extraction
is estimated from 1250 to 1600 Mcm yr−1 at the entrance to the Dead Sea (Soffer,
1994; Lonergan and Brooks, 1994). Figure 1 shows the Jordan River System with
the main existing and planned water projects including the National Water Carrier
and the East Ghor Canal discussed earlier.
3. International Water Law
International water law and international institutions must play a leading role in
solving water conflicts and reducing the associated risks of war and pollution.
International water law may be the acceptable basis of an agreement for the ripari-
ans of the Jordan River basin. In 1991, the International Law Commission (ILC),
an organisation created by the United Nations developed the Helsinki Rules and
completed the drafting and provisional adoption of 32 articles on the law of the
Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. In 1997, the United Nations
General Assembly adopted a Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses
of International Watercourses. The pertinent aspect of international water law is the
following principles spelled out in the above convention and Helsinki Rules that
help to reduce tensions and encourage effective and productive negotiations by the
parties involved. It should be noted that these principles are not ranked according
to priority (Gleick, 1994; UN, 1997):
• equitable allocation;
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Figure 1. The Jordan River system.
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Table I. Factors associated with equitable water use
Factor Definition
F1 The geography of the basin, including in particular the extent of the drainage
area in the territory of each basin state.
F2 The hydrology of the basin, including in particular the contribution of water by
each basin.
F3 The climate affecting the basin.
F4 The past utilisation of the waters of the basin, including in particular existing
utilisation.
F5 The economic and social needs of each basin state.
F6 The population dependent on the waters of the basin in each basin state.
F7 The comparative costs of alternative means of satisfying the economic and
social needs of each basin states.
F8 The availability of other resources.
F9 The degree to which the needs of a basin state may be satisfied, without causing
appreciable harm and substantial injury to a co-basin state.
• obligation to resolve water related disputes peacefully;
• obligation not to cause harm to other riparian states;
• obligation to exchange hydrologic and other relevant data and information on
a regular basis.
The international water law by itself is nonbinding and lacks enforcement mech-
anisms. This is true, but it may also be the ‘best we have got’ as a guide for
negotiations and contain ‘checks and balances’ that, if approached in good faith,
would protect the interests of all parties. Questions remain about the relative im-
portance of these principles and means of enforcement (Caponera, 1994; Elmusa,
1994). In some ways, the more challenging task for negotiators is to translate those
principles into operating rules and procedures to determine the equitable apportion-
ment of waters from shared water resources. One assumes that Arab and Israelis
would wish to abide by international water law.
The principle of equitable allocation is one of the most important developed by
ILC and the Helsinki statements. At the same time, it is one of the most difficult to
define, given the multitude of variables that should be taken into account (Gleick,
1994). The principle of equitable allocation means that each basin state is entitled
to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial use of shared water. ‘Equitable’
does not mean equal use. Rather, it means that a large variety of factors, including
population, hydrology, climate, existing uses, and so on, must be considered in
the allocation of water rights. Table I lists the diverse factors that the International
Law Association associated with equitable water use (Eaton and Eaton, 1994; UN,
1997).
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Table II. Alternative equity standards (share in percent)
Equity standard F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9
No.
Israel share 9 12 10 60 8.4 16.4 6.7 19 8.4
Jordan share 39 38 12 25 5.3 14.5 26.7 21 5.3
Lebanon share 3 8 29 1 11.6 11.2 20 9 11.6
Syria share 37 31 29 12 70.8 47.1 13.3 8 70.8
Palestine share 12 11 20 2 3.9 10.8 33.3 43 3.9
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
It is to be noted that each factor is not to be considered in isolation, but looked
at together with all the other factors, without any of them being given priority. This
theory neither purports to identify fixed criteria in the sharing of international wa-
ter, nor to protect existing water rights. Rather it aims at establishing a mechanism
for cooperation and negotiation with a view to reaching an agreement (Caponera,
1994).
4. An Approach for Allocating the Waters of the Jordan River Basin
There has been much written in recent years about the application of water law in
the Jordan River basin, as well as the development of different allocation schemes
based on the interpretation of these ‘laws’ or using other criteria. These public-
ations include Assaf et al. (1993), Shuval (1994), Moore (1994), Gleick (1994),
Caponera (1994), Elmusa (1994), Al-Kloub and Abu-Taleb (1998), and Haddadin
(2000).
The approach presented here will provide one possible approach to the prob-
lem of allocating the waters of the Jordan River between all riparian parties. The
approach translates the principle of equitable utilisation into a set of procedures to
determine the riparians’ entitlements to the shared waters.
The nine equity factors (Table I) were applied yielding alternative nine equity
standards (Table II). These equity standards served as benchmarks against which
various possible allocation outcomes were measured. The equity factors and the
derivation of the equity standards summarized in Table II are stated below.
It should be emphasized that the particular equity factors used in this research
and their derivative allocation standards were selected for illustrative purposes only
and are not claimed to be exhaustive; as many or as few factors as are deemed
relevant can be incorporated into the approach. Moreover, the following numerical
example is to demonstrate the workings of the decision tool. It is not claimed that
the entitlements as calculated here are those that should be adopted in practice.
ALLOCATING THE WATERS OF THE JORDAN RIVER BASIN 453
Table III. Catchment area and riparian contributions in the Jordan River Basin
(km2)
Israel Jordan Lebanon Syria Palestine Total
share share share share share
Catchment 1867 7663 664 7301 2344 19839
area (km2)
F1 equity 9 39 3 37 12 100
standard (%)
Source: Elmusa (1997).
Table IV. Riparians’ contribution to the flow of the Jordan River Basin
Israel Jordan Lebanon Syria Palestine Total
share share share share share
Discharge (Mcm yr−1) 155 506 115 416 148 1340
F2 equity standard (%) 12 38 8 31 11 100
Source: GTZ (1996).
4.1. FACTOR F1 – GEOGRAPHY
The geography of the basin determines the amount of rainfall caught and, con-
sequently, the total volume of surface and ground water run-off into the main-
stream courses (influenced by such factors as the climate regime, topography, geo-
logy, soil characteristics, vegetation cover and drainage network of the catchment).
Thus, the proportion of the catchment area laying within each watercourse state
represents only one measure of the inflow to the basin coming from these states.
Table III presents one estimate of each riparians’ share of the Jordan River catch-
ment area and the equity standard derived from this factor.
4.2. FACTOR F2 – HYDROLOGY
The hydrology of the Jordan River basin affect the discharge of the stream that can
be defined as the total volume of water flowing past a given point in a known unit
of time. Table IV offers one estimate of the average annual riparians’ contribution
to the discharge of the Jordan River basin and the equity standard derived from this
factor.
4.3. FACTOR F3 – CLIMATE
The climate affecting the basin is related to many climatic factors such as precipit-
ation, evapotranspiration, temperature and humidity that should be considered. In
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Table V. Average annual rainfall over the Jordan River Basin
Israel Jordan Lebanon Syria Palestine Total
share share share share share
Rainfall (mm) 184 222 508 508 361 1783
F3 Equity standard (%) 10 12 29 29 20 100
Source: GTZ (1996).
Table VI. Existing utilisation of the Jordan River Basin
Israel Jordan Lebanon Syria Palestine Total
share share share share share
Quantity (Mcm yr−1) 810 340 5 165 20 1340
F4 Equity standard (%) 60 25 1 12 2 100
Source: GTZ (1996).
this research precipitation was considered for the Jordan River basin as shown in
Table V (other factors could be considered as well).
4.4. FACTOR F4 – UTILIZATION
Israel is currently the dominant user of the waters of the Jordan River basin. With
the capture of the Golan Heights during the Six-Day War and the extension of the
security zone into southern Lebanon, Israel became the major user of the Jordan
River. Table VI presents the existing utilization of the Jordan River basin and the
equity standard derived from this factor.
4.5. FACTOR F5 – ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL NEEDS
The economic and social needs of each basin state can be quantified by estim-
ating the projected water demands form all sources for domestic, industrial and
agricultural sectors for the five riparian states as summarised in Table VII.
Table VII. Projected water demands (million m3)1
Israel Jordan Lebanon Syria Palestine Total
Water demand for the 2800 1760 3850 23555 1290 33255
year 2025 (million m3)
F5 equity standard (%) 8.4 5.3 11.6 70.8 3.9 100
Source: ESCWA (2002) except the figures for Israel, which were compiled by the authors
from GTZ (1996).
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Table VIII. Projected population for the year 2015 (millions)
Israel Jordan Lebanon Syria Palestine Total
share share share share share
Population 1998 6.0 4.6 4.2 15.3 2.7 32.8
Population 2015 7.6 6.7 5.2 21.8 5 46.3
F6 equity standard (%) 16.4 14.5 11.2 47.1 10.8 100
Source: World Bank (2000).
Table IX. GDP for the Jordan River Basin riparians (millions U.S.$)
Israel Jordan Lebanon Syria Palestine Total
share share share share share
GDP (1998) 100525 7393 17229 17412 3589 146148
Rank 1 4 3 2 5
F7 equity standard (%) 6.7 26.7 20 13.3 33.3 100
Source: World Bank (2000).
4.6. FACTOR F6 – POPULATION
The countries of the Jordan River Basin have a high rate of population growth that
is likely to intensify freshwater conflicts in the future. A much higher population
level will inevitably lower per capita water availability, which might exacerbate
freshwater tensions in the region. Table VIII presents the projected population for
the countries of the Jordan River basin and the equity standard derived from this
factor.
4.7. FACTOR F7 – COMPARATIVE COSTS OF ALTERNATIVES
Alternative water resources refer specifically to potential sources such as desalin-
ation and imported water that are not presently exploited. The impact of these al-
ternatives on the equation of equitable apportionment depends on their availability
and comparative costs of harnessing them (Elmusa, 1994). Both desalination and
importation of water could be available alternatives since all riparian states have
ground brackish water and enjoy sea front on the Mediterranean Sea. Moreover,
there are numerous schemes that have been proposed for transporting water via
pipelines or canals from the ‘water rich’ countries in the Middle East like Turkey,
to poorly endowed countries (Murakami and Musiake, 1994).
The comparative costs are a yardstick of the parties’ ability to harness alternat-
ive resources. The party that is more capable of paying for water and tapping the
desalination option than other riparian states would be entitled to a smaller share
of the common waters (just within the confines of this factor). In this research,
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Table X. Renewable water resources and water demands in the countries of the Jordan
River Basin
Israel Jordan Lebanon Syria Palestine
Total renewable water resources 1104 627 3100 21475 215
(million m3)
Water demand for the year 2025 2800 1760 3850 23555 1290
(million m3)
WSI (for the year 2025) 254 281 124 110 600
F8 equity standard (%) 19 21 9 8 43
Source: ESCWA (2002) except the figures for Israel, which were compiled by the authors
from GTZ (1996).
GDP was taken as measure of comparison to reach the equity standard as shown in
Table IX.
The comparative costs can be restated as the relative ability of the consumer
to pay for higher priced alternatives supplies such as desalinated water. Based on
the present consumer prices in all riparian states as well as on various estimates of
desalination costs, the following can be inferred. In Israel, desalinated brackish and
saline water is affordable for municipal use and economical for agriculture, while
desalinated seawater is affordable for domestic use and may be economical for
some crops. Palestinian, Syrian, Lebanese, and Jordanian consumers, conversely,
would be heavily burdened by the costs of desalinated water (Kally, 1994).
4.8. FACTOR F8 – AVAILABILITY OF OTHER RESOURCES
Renewable water resources, water demands and Water Stress Index (WSI) in the
countries of the Jordan River basin are presented in Table X. The WSI is the ratio
of water withdrawal or demand to water availability. The state that has less WSI
would be entitled to a smaller share of the common waters (just within the confines
of this factor). Accordingly, Table X was compiled to obtain the equity standard.
4.9. FACTOR F9 – APPRECIABLE HARM
The words ‘appreciable harm’ have created definitional problems to all riparian
states (Elmusa, 1994). Goldberg (1992) defined appreciable harm as the costs that
can be objectively measured as result of denial of allocation. The implication of
this factor is obvious: to achieve equitable division no riparian can deny water to
a co-riparian if that denial causes appreciable harm. Water must be reallocated to
stop the infringement. To assess the significant harm in this research, the following
statement for the ILC cited in Goldberg (1992) may be helpful: ‘harm must be cap-
able of being established by objective evidence. There must be a real impairment
of use, i.e. a detrimental impact of some consequence upon, for example, public
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Table XI. Weight of alternative equity standardsa
Equity factor F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9
Average 8 15 14 20 12 10 8 8 5
weight (%)
Range 7–12 12–16 12–15 17–22 10–13 8–11 7–9 7–11 2–7
a Table compiled by the authors based on the collected questionnaires.
health, industry, property, agriculture, or the environment in the affected state’. In
other words, appreciable harm can be gauged by its impact on the social, economic
and environmental needs. Accordingly, if the appreciable harm factor is broadened
to focus on the social and economic needs, it will become effectively identical with
Factor F5 (economic and social needs) discussed previously. Therefore, Factor F9
(appreciable harm) will have the same equity standards derived for Factor F5.
5. Optimal Allocation Outcome to the Shared Surface Water Resources
It could be argued that some of the equity factors discussed above should be given
greater prominence when determining states’ entitlements. But which factors? To
answer this question, and to facilitate the development of a realistic weight for
each factor, a questionnaire has been designed and sent to ninety water experts all
over the world including experts from the five riparian countries. The water experts
who work in water institutions, universities and non-governmental organizations
involve professional economists, irrigation engineers, water resources engineers
and lawyers. The questionnaire summarized the international water law, the prob-
lem and the approach of the research. The main task for the experts was to assign a
weight for each of the nine equity factors (the summation of all weights should be
one hundred). Table XI presents the average weight for each equity factor obtained
from the collected answered questionnaires.
Returning to the nine alternative equity standards (Table II), there is no mani-
festly ‘best’ division of waters; the standards do not converge on any one particular
allocation outcome. The task, then, was to identify that outcome which did the
‘least upset’ to the nine equity standards taken together, i.e. to distinguish an op-
timal allocation outcome which, while not necessarily the best when measured
against each equity standard in isolation, was the least worst of all outcomes when
all nine were taken equally into account.
Each equity standard listed in Table II can be written as Fi = (Xi1, Xi2, Xi3, Xi4,
Xi5) that specify the proportional shares of the Jordan River basin waters allocated
to the riparians, where i refers to the equity standard, Xi1 represents the Israeli, Xi2
the Jordanian, Xi3 the Lebanese, Xi4 the Syrian, and Xi5 the Palestinian shares. The
sum of the five shares equals 100%. To illustrate, the first and second alternative
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equity standards can be written, respectively, as F1 (9, 39, 3, 37, 12) and F2 (12,
38, 8, 31, 11).
Any allocation outcome can be written as Xj = (X1, X2, X3, X4, X5) that specify
the proportional entitlements of the Jordan River basin waters allocated to the five
riparians, where X1 represents the Israeli, X2 the Jordanian, X3 the Lebanese, X4
the Syrian, and X5 the Palestinian entitlements. The sum of the five entitlements
equals 100%.
The optimal allocation outcome can be written as X∗j = (X∗1, X∗2, X∗3, X∗4, X∗5)
and can be defined as the one that minimises the square of the summation of the
distances (d) measured outward from itself to all equity standards. The objective
function was derived (Equation (1)) to satisfy the above stated criterion (minimizes
the square of the summation of the distances). The mathematics of the objective
function considered the weight of the equity factors.
Minimize d =
9∑
i=1
Wi
5∑
j=1
(
Xij − X∗j
)2
, (1)
where
i = 1, . . ., 9, refers to the equity standards.
j = 1, . . ., 5, refers to the riparian countries.
d = square of the summation of the distances between the allocation
outcome and the equity standards.
X∗j = the entitlements of the jth country from the shared water (%).
Wi = the weight of the ith equity factor (%).
Xij = the share of the ith equity factor for the j th country (%).
To find the optimal allocation outcome (X∗j ) from set of possible allocation out-
comes where the objective function has its smallest value (i.e. to optimize Equa-
tion (1)), the point where the first derivative of the equation equals zero was found.
Accordingly, the first derivative of Equation (1) was found and equalled to zero
( ∂d
∂X∗j
= 0). This leads to Equation (2), which is the optimal solution of Equation (1).
X∗j =
9∑
i=1
WiXij
9∑
i=1
Wi
. (2)
Applying Equation (2) to the Jordan River basin and based on Tables II and XI, the
optimal allocation outcome specifies the proportional entitlements of the Jordan
River basin waters allocated to the five riparians. The equation yields the following
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Figure 2. Optimal allocation for the river basin.
results (21, 22, 11, 32, and 14%), where 21 represents the Israeli, 22 the Jordanian,
11 the Lebanese, 32 the Syrian, and 14 the Palestinian entitlements as presented in
Figure 2.
As noted earlier, the aim of this exercise is not to provide a definitive solu-
tion to the question of all riparians’ entitlements. Rather, it is to demonstrate a
methodology by which such entitlements can be calculated. Ultimately, the choice
of standards to include is one for the negotiating parties themselves, should they
decide to use this decision tool in support of their negotiations. In the final analysis
it is only through direct negotiation that an eventual agreement can be reached and
it is not the task of this paper to prejudge the outcome of that process.
6. Conclusions
The scarcity of water in the Jordan River basin makes water allocation one of the
central issues to be resolved in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In this basin, the inter-
national water law that regulate riparian rights are not well observed. This article
calls for the application of the international water law that can play a positive role
in the resolution of water disputes in the negotiating process.
The methodological approach presented in this paper may be one way of ap-
proaching the problem of water allocations of the Jordan River basin and hopefully
will provide some input into the negotiating process. It may be controversial and
raise many objections, however, it is presented as food for thought.
The procedures described in this paper for determining the optimal allocation
outcome used nine operational definitions of the ILC equity factors; clearly, these
definitions were not exhaustive. One of the first tasks for negotiators, therefore, is to
define and utilize such other factors as are deemed relevant to this particular water
sharing problem. Assuming this methodology was adopted as a decision support
tool in the context of the Middle East peace process negotiations, it would be up to
the parties to decide which of the ILC equity factors are applicable to the Jordan
River basin and to determine the appropriate utilization of these factors. They may
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reject any or all the equity standards used in this analysis, or include others not
considered here.
Sharing water resources data is considered a basic tenet of water international
law, yet accurate long-term data on shared and disputed water resources in the
Jordan River basin are often restricted. This restriction must stop if any progress
is to be made in resolving water disputes, and all water resources data should be
immediately and fully released to all parties.
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